The 'pink tide' in Latin America, or what remains of it, is drawing increasing criticisms from the political left for its inability to confront existing socio-structural inequalities. This article contributes to these debates in two ways. First, as a means of understanding better the development strategies that have been followed by left-leaning governments, it highlights and critiques what it labels Elite Development Theory (EDT) encompassing Washington Consensus and Statist Political Economy. It shows how despite its self-stated objectives -the amelioration of the conditions of the poor and their uplifting -EDT is grounded in elite assumptions about social change: States and corporations are posited as prime-movers in the development process while collective efforts of labouring classes to pursue their own developmental strategies are ignored and/or de-legitimated. Exploitation, oppression and the ideological delegitimation of labouring class collective actions form the core of EDT. The second contribution of this article is to argue for an alternative form of what it terms labour-centred development (LCD). This argument is supported through an examination of the Chilean cordones industriales and Argentinian empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores (ERT) movements. The article concludes that whilst LCD may be a rarity, its existence offers the basis for alternative development theory and strategy.
which they govern(ed), left-wing Latin American governments have supported and encouraged the reproduction of hierarchical and exploitative social relations.
These policies -including containment of wage demands, limits on popular participation in resource allocation, resource extractivism based on an openness to foreign direct investment (across economic sectors), and more generally the promotion of indigenous capitalist class formation -reproduce the power of capital over labour. Where they still exist, the progressive shine is rapidly coming off the pink tide regimes. It is necessary, therefore, to reconsider what alternative forms of development look like.
This article contributes to debates about the possibility of pursuing progressive development strategies in Latin America and beyond in two ways.
First, it provides a theoretical critique of what it labels Elite Development Theory (EDT). Such a critique shows how, despite many different conceptions of statesociety relations, EDT's share an axiomatic common ground which legitimates labour exploitation and oppression. The strands of EDT examined in this article are the Washington Consensus and Statist Political Economy. While these perspectives have significant differences, it is argued here that they share a common axiomatic foundation -that states and capital are prime-movers in, and that labour control is a constitutive feature of, the development process. The neodevelopmentalist strategies pursued across much of Latin America rest upon the same axioms that are foundational to EDT.
Whilst there has been broad praise for Latin America's Pink Tide (Riesco 2007; Wylde 2012) , the strategies pursued by these regimes have been critiqued for relying on the deepening exploitation and oppression of worker resistance characteristic of EDT (Leiva 2008; Mariña-Flores 2015) . This is increasingly apparent in some leading examples from across the continent. In Brazil, labour and other marginalised social actors have been incorporated into the developmental project of the state, seeing minimal social benefits but the continuation of the existing social and political order (Saad-Filho 2015; Chodor 2015) . The order that preceded Lula remains firmly intact. Hence Alfrado SaadFilho notes how " [t] here has been no meaningful attempt to reform the Constitution or the political system, challenge the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism, neutralize the mainstream media, or transform the country's economic structure or international integration" (Saad-Filho 2015) .
In Ecuador there is a similar picture. Despite offering vague promises of "living well", the Correa government has focused on consolidating existing economic privilege and power. Jeff Webber argues that "Correa calmed the storm and restored profits in sectors like banking, mining, oil, and agro-industry, and has simultaneously coopted or crushed most independent social movement activity" (Webber 2015) .
In both of these instances, state-led neodevelopmentalism has provided the labouring classes with some social and economic benefits and some political inclusion. But this has come at a cost of embedding the prevailing mode of development premised on their continuing exploitation.
1 Such contradictions have now begun to crystallise as the region faces up to the "end of the cycle" of progressive government (Mondonesi 2015; Katz 2016) . The resurgence of the Right under Macri in Argentina and the coalition of parties that recently dented PSUV hegemony in Venezuela represent the failure of these governments to meet the popular demands that brought them to power. 1 The case of Brazil is archetypical of what Castañeda (2006) has referred to as the "good left" in Latin America, adopting pragmatic, reformist strategies that do little to confront the prevailing socio-economic order. Ecuador under Rafael Correa, alternatively, is seen to constitute part of the "bad left" driven by populist-inspired confrontation with domestic and international elites. Yet recent research has shown such crude dichotomies to be severely limiting, with the Pink Tide characterised by differing models of governance and economic and social policies with complex historical origins and relations to earlier neoliberal reforms (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2009; MacDonald & Ruckert 2009a; Silva 2009 ). Recognising the significance of the diversity across the region, our argument echoes that of MacDonald and Ruckert (2009b: 10) inasmuch as we understand top-down neodevelopmentalism as premised on a "deep conditioning and social engineering" of individuals to market relations. Even the most radical cases, namely Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela, remain subject to such processes (Webber 2009; Domingo 2009; Meltzer 2009 ).
This article argues that developmental processes, whether top-down or bottom-up, are generated primarily through the transformation of class relations.
The ability of capital and states to mobilise, discipline and employ labour is the foundation upon which capitalist development, whether state or market-led, is based. The core concerns of EDT -of state capacity, resource mobilisation/generation and structural transformation, and the entrepreneurial drive to innovate and accumulate capital -are based, fundamentally, upon labour control. Without the latter, the former cannot occur.
The second contribution of this article is to identify non-elite forms of human development in Latin America, past and present. Part 5 concludes by discussing the prospects for LCD as a realistic rival to EDT.
-CLASS RELATIONS IN ELITE DEVELOPMENT THEORY
This section provides a brief discussion of the Washington consensus and Statist Political Economy, as representatives of Elite Development Theory. In many ways neodevelopmentalism in Latin America represents a particular amalgam of these two traditions, with the addition of limited progressive social policy (SaadFilho: 2015 , Webber: 2015 . Whilst labour control and exploitation are recognised by EDT, the class struggles waged from above by states and capital necessary to achieve it, are neither theorised nor recognised as constitutive of the development process. Rather, they are subsumed within EDT's primary foci, in particular state capacity and innovative entrepreneurial drive. This subsumption obscures the importance to EDT of class relations in general and labour control in particular. 
Washington-Consensus Style Neoliberalism
The Washington Consensus (WC) conception of development derives from Adam Smith's understanding of gains from specialization, David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, and marginalist economics' emphasis upon 'perfect' markets. For the purposes of this article, it is the last in this triptych that reveals most clearly the labour repressive core of this variant of EDT. The marginalist conception of (perfect) markets holds that rigidities or inflexibilities reduce welfare gains from market participation.
The concept of market inflexibitily is utilized by WC proponents to theorise and justify (deleterious) reforms to workers' conditions. Eliminating labour market inflexibilities is held to generate virtuous circles of rising firm profits, greater employment, and higher economic growth. Labour market inflexibilities were defined by Robert Solow as follows:
[A] labour market is inflexible if the level of unemployment-insurance benefits is too high or their duration is too long, or if there are too many restrictions on the freedom of employers to fire and to hire, or if the permissible hours of work are too tightly regulated, or if excessively generous compensation for overtime work is mandated, or if trade unions have too much power to protect incumbent workers against competition and to control the flow of work at the site of production, or perhaps if statutory health and safety regulations are too stringent (Solow: 1988, 1) .
Restoring labour market flexibility is portrayed as being in workers long-run interests. For example, Anne Kreuger argues that 'with a sufficiently low urban wage, a zero unemployment level is a feasible outcome…' (Kreuger: 1983, 20) . Connell and Dados (2014) argue that neoliberal economic policies originated in Latin America and were only later formalised as the Washington Consensus.
Indeed, Pinochet's 1973 coup in Chile signifies the first significant attempt to genuinely establish a liberal economy with minimal labour market distortions.
The intense violence, both direct (the tortures and murders during and after the coup) and indirect (through the labour market and the generation of mass unemployment and very low wage jobs) were welcomed by neoliberal supporters.
Friedrich Hayek wrote how "I have not been able to find a single person even in much-maligned Chile who did not agree that personal freedom was much greater under Pinochet than it had been under Allende" (1978). Connell and Dados (2014) argue that neoliberal type policies play an important role for peripheral countries' elites. They rationalise these countries' insertion into the world economy based on their comparative advantage.
Consequently, such policies do not need to be forced upon these elites by northern powers, but in many ways reflect the former's interests. Such elites, often organised around the agro-export sector, are resistant to state-led attempts to shift resources into industry. This is so, particularly, because such attempts often involve alterations in class relations.
The Washington-Consensus has been intellectually opposed by Statist Political Economy. However, despite important policy differences between neoliberal and statist political economists these two traditions share much common ground, in particular their refusal to consider how labouring classes can forge their own development strategies.
Statist Political Economy
Statist Political Economy (SPE) is rooted in the work of Alexander Hamilton (1791) Selwyn: 2014) .
In Latin America, this has been complemented by the re-emergence of (neo)structuralist thinking, a major innovation supportive of neodevelopmentalist strategies around the pink tide (Leiva 2008 In his comparative study of late development in South Korea, India, Brazil and Nigeria, Atul Kohli (2004) illustrates the ability of the former state to allocate resources efficiently and to successfully implement long term industrial upgrading strategies. He notes, like Amsden, the need for strict workplace discipline. He also compares South Korea to the interwar European Fascist states.
He concludes that:
Generally right-wing authoritarian…[these states]… prioritize rapid industrialization as a national goal, are staffed competently, work closely with industrialists, systematically discipline and repress labour, penetrate and control the rural society, and use economic nationalism as a tool of political mobilisation (Kohli 2004, 381) .
In Latin America the record of statist economic orientation is more varied. On the one hand Vargas's fascist-inspired Estado Novo (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) EDT's subsumption of the labour question to its higher priorities of (combinations of) innovative entrepreneurial strategy and state resource generation and allocation relegates the capital-labour relation to secondary importance within the analysis of development. Labour control tends to be conceived of as a technical issue, to be resolved by state agencies and firm managers. Interestingly, Max Weber expressed well the concerns common to EDT in his conception of economic rationality. The latter requires the firm subordination of labour to capitalist managers:
It is generally possible to achieve a higher level of economic rationality if management has extensive control over the selection and the modes of use of workers, as compared with the situation created by the appropriation of jobs or the existence of rights to participation in management. The latter conditions produce technically irrational obstacles as well as economic irrationalities. In particular, considerations appropriate to… the interests of workers in the maintenance of jobs… are often in conflict with the rationality of the organisation (Weber: 1978: 137-8) .
Hence, while Weber advocates 'extensive control' by management over labour, he recognises that the latter has its own concerns, which might come into conflict with the former. This observation is important, because as we shall argue below, it opens the way towards an alternative conception of resource allocation, social wealth and social relations, and ultimately of human development. EDT views the relationship between labour and capital as follows:
-THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOUR AND THE THEORY
where K = capital and WL = wage labour. In this schema capital reproduces and expands itself (accumulates and heightens is competitiveness) through its employment of wage labour in order to generate exchange values (goods to sell on the market), and surplus value (K'), through an institutionalised capture of workers' unpaid labour.
From this vantage point, any disruption to capital's employment of wage labour harms capital's objectives of accumulation and labour's objectives of higher wages and better working conditions (such as shorter hours). A range of strategies designed by capital to discipline labour are therefore theoretically and practically justified. As will be argued below, these strategies are not only used to secure the production of exchange values and surplus value. They are also used in order to preclude the emergence of the political economy of labour.
A Labour-Centred Development (LCD) perspective starts from the opposite side of the capital-wage labour relation. It views the relationship between wage labour and capital as follows:
Here labour must sell itself to capital in order to earn the wages required to reproduce itself. Put differently, capital mediates the reproduction of labouring class needs. However, in this context of mediation, the objectives of labour are not simply subsumed under those of capital, but are sought by workers sometimes within the wage-labour relation and sometimes against it. Importantly, as will be discussed, the objectives of labour generate an alternative vision of social needs and social wealth, which can give rise to an alternative political economy of development. These two sets of needs (of capital and of wage-labour) mostly coexist within an institutionally defined context where the needs of the former determine those of the latter. But the fact of the existence of the latter means that there is always the possibility that it will, through collective action, begin to be formulated in ways that reject the primacy of capital and its mediating role.
From this perspective the core concerns for LCD analysis are not those of capital (how to secure accumulation), but those of labouring classes. These include workers' ability to reproduce their wage labour outside work (i.e. to earn enough wages and have enough time to secure the basic necessities of life and to engage in culturally-enhancing activities such as socialising and education), extending to more free time (shorter working days) andmore decision-making ability within the workplace (to reduce the burden of work) (see below).
Because EDT views labouring class needs as deriving from securing the needs of capital, it fails to comprehend or attempts to obscure, the potential existence of a rival political economy to its own. Furthermore, EDT's capitalcentric vantage point means that it reduces labour power, and consequently a large segment and sometimes the majority of society, to an input into the production process.
LCD's vantage point -its recognition of the potential existence of two rival political economies of human development -enables it to comprehend labour power as something fundamentally different to that envisioned by EDT.
As Michael Lebowitz (2003, 127) describes:
The value of labour-power looks different from the two sides of capital/wage-labour relation. Just as for capital it is the cost of an input for the capitalist process of production, for workers it is the cost of inputs for their own process of production.
Consequently:
Two different moments of production, two different goals, two different perspectives on the value of labour-power; while for capital, the value of labour-power is a means of satisfying its goal of surplus value…for the wage-labourer, it is the mans of satisfying the goal of self-development (Lebowitz: 2003, 127) .
Whilst EDT claims to point to a future characterised by a high and rising level of human development, the way it views the capital -wage-labour relation (K -WL 
One or Two Political Economies?
The LCD perspective advanced here argues that the political economy of labour represents a potential rival to the political economy of capital. Its rivalry is expressed, most clearly, through a) its different conception of social wealth and how to use it, and b) through its struggle with capital to make a) part of societal common sense (to a greater or lesser extent). A form of this struggle that is constitutive to the capitalist development process is that pursued by capital to deny the existence of a rival political economy to itself. As Lebowitz notes, '[C]apital does not merely seek the realisation of its own goal, valorisation; it also must seek to suspend the realisation of the goals of wage-labour' (Lebowitz: 1992, 85 However, workers' organisations contradict these rules and potentially represent an alternative political economy. Collective gains against capital are won through 'negating competition, [and] infringing on the 'sacred' law of supply and demand and engaging in 'planned co-operation''. (Lebowitz: 1992, 67, citing Marx) .
The political economy of labour is generated by labouring class collective actions. In turn it gives rise to novel developmental dynamics that are invisible and antithetical to EDT.
States and the Capital-Labour Relation
States play a central role in constructing and managing the political and legal structures within which capital accumulation occurs. These structures constrain workers' ability to organise, by determining which actions are legally recognised. States work to naturalise and implement across society the political economy of capital. Bob Jessop's (2001 Jessop's ( , 2008 used, how it should be allocated -means that the former's incorporation and institutionalisation within the state will be subordinate to the latter's. Furthermore, it is likely that representatives of the latter will attempt to strictly delimit and potentially reduce labouring class influence within the state. As we shall in both cases below, incorporation into the state often leads to the disarticulation of and/or deepening conflict with workers' movement as a consequence of these limitations.
-LABOUR-CENTRED DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
In this section we will examine two cases of labour-centred development: the cordones industriales in Chile and the empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores (ERT) in Argentina. We show that the developmental outcomes of both cases derive from the historical contexts in which they were established, the origins of their emergence, and the organisational forms established by workers.
Significantly, whilst the Chilean factory occupations occurred in the context of widespread revolutionary tumult, with the electoral victory of Salvador Allende in 1970 and mass mobilisations throughout the economy continuing throughout the three years of his government, those in Argentina are a marginal, albeit growing, phenomenon. As we show in our case study, current employment levels remain below 10 000 workers which, although significant, highlights the immense challenges faced across the disparate sectors to which these workers contribute.
From here, we explore the developmental outcomes and their implications for understanding a development led by and for workers. Findings are drawn from primary and secondary empirical data and focus on four core aspects:
(1) Growth and productivity (2) Employment data (3) Workplace organisation (4) Production priorities
Moreover, whilst many of the changes were (and continue to be) dramatic and the lessons that can be drawn from them potentially transformative, we acknowledge their limitations. In this sense, we show that the struggle that we place at the heart of the development process is, as argued by Michael Lebowitz (2003: 204) , less the result of labour placing barriers to the political economy of capital, but rather capital continually mobilising to impose barriers to the political economy of labour, and by and large, succeeding in its attempts to do so.
-Chile and the cordones industriales: a revolution in development
Nearly Workers from these firms played a leading role in the organisation of the cordones, establishing networks of production and exchange, providing the spaces for mass meetings where the decisions were taken about occupation, mobilisation, and self-management, where armed defensive groups were organised to protect against right-wing militias and growing police and military violence, and where much of the technical expertise that was disseminated originated.
5
Political activists, particular those from the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), also played an important role in this process (Luciano in Gaudichaud 2004: 114; Cancino 1988: 217) . But it was the increasingly contested practice of worker participation, including in the management of production, which was crucial.
Participation schemes were introduced to firms in the APS (as will be discussed below), but in many of the smaller plants workers set the terms of their own participation. Significantly, relative neglect by the UP produced a new set of social practices labelled as a "new popular sociability" in these workplaces, as the need to act outside established "formal institutional pathways" subverted established forms of participation (Castillo 2009: 241-242; Moulian 2006: 268) .
As a result, formal demands in "First Textile Workers Meeting" on the 14 th and 15 th July 1973 criticised the state-led schemes as "superstructural" (Castillo 2009: 245-246) . For workers in the cordones both in the small and large factories, the "road to socialism" being pursued by the UP simply did not meet the expectations created by their experiences in the spaces they now controlled.
It was these new spaces and emergent practices that were central to new forms of development. The UP sought, through a policy of "reactivation", to increase output through subsidy and credit to nationalised firms and through centralised control over production. These measures ranged from the worker participation schemes to early "cybernetic" programme for automated control over production (Medina 2011 ).
Workers were mobilised through the Communist Party-inspired "battle for production" slogan, which called on those in the factory to boost output to support the UP (Fishwick 2015a ). In the workplace this translated to a reorientation of the priorities of production. Rather than productivity increases based on the intensification of the working day, improvements were achieved through improved utilisation of machinery and increased employment. Output increased notably (see Table 1 ). Of those large textile firms in the cordones, Ex-Sumar Planta Poliester saw an increase in output of between 15 per cent and 20 per cent and Textil Progreso raised output by 19 per cent within the first year of its incorporation into the APS. In addition to increased output, the needs of workers were addressed in new ways. Within these factories, they constructed a paediatric clinic, a nursery for forty children, provided transport for 6 Economic data is drawn from some remaining examples of trade union newspapers Central Única and FENATEX held in the National Library in Santiago, Chile. However, one legacy of the Pinochet dictatorship was to ensure trade union and opposition party archives, radical newspapers, and personal documents were largely destroyed (Erickson et al 1974: 121) . Consequently, findings are necessarily fragmentary and incomplete.
workers, and improved medical services (FENATEX 07/71, 1: 2; Central Única 6-7/1972, 9: 7). Increases in production volumes were orientated toward making a tangible difference to the lives of workers, their families, and their communities, rather than, as prior to workers' control, to demands of accumulation and profitability.
Dramatic changes also occurred in rates of employment across leading sectors. Prior to 1970, productivity increases relied on employment reduction and the introduction of modern techniques of workplace organisation (which will be discussed further below). At Yarur, for example, the largest textile firm in Chile, a failed general strike in 1962 allowed the firm to fire over 1000 workers, which was the amount recommended by American advisors Burlington Mills for its modernisation (Winn 1994: 30-31) . In contrast, after 1970, the largest firms -as a result of increasing output levels achieved under workers' control and of workers utilising new machinery in new ways -were extensively hiring new workers. For example, at Rayón Said, a leading producer of synthetic fibres, production increases of over 50 per cent allowed for the hiring of forty new workers (FENATEX 07/71, 1: 2). Reflecting these changes on a national scale, between 1970 and 1973, manufacturing employment throughout the economy rose by over 100 000 to roughly 664 000 (Stallings 1978: 256-257 ).
Alongside such changes in production and employment, wages also grew significantly (table 2). per cent in 1972 (Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 47) .
New and increasing employment levels came with important transformations in the workplace. Workplace relations previously were typified by strong managerial discipline, relatively limited political representation, and poor working conditions (Angell 1969; Fishwick 2015b) . In contrast, worker participation became a central feature of those firms in the APS and the cordones.
For example, General Workers' Assemblies were established that chose representatives to an Administrative Council and Production Unit Assemblies. At their peak, these schemes incorporated around 50 000 workers across the manufacturing sector (Frias et al 1987: 38; Silva 1999: 85-86) . At Yarur, this "comanagement…stretched from the production committees on the factory floor elected by each work section to the enterprise's Council of Administration", with "the transformation of workers into managers…Ex-Yarur's most significant achievement" (Winn 1986: 210-211) .
As previously highlighted, these practices of participation were intensified and transformed within the network of firms in the cordones. At the height of the Bosses Strike in 1972, for example, materials and expertise were lent between factories as production was continued without the presence of owners. In cordon Cerillos-Maipú, production, distribution, and supply were coordinated by workers, whilst workers at Ex-Sumar made trade and credit arrangements with neighbouring factories. Technical advisors gave assistance to smaller firms, whilst in workplace assemblies questions were openly raised on the division of labour, factory hierarchy, and the legitimacy of private ownership (Hernán Ortega in Gaudichaud 2004: 202; Castillo 2009: 175 & 234-235; Gaudichaud 2005: 95) .
The new social organisation of production, premised on worker-led networks of small and large firms not only upended the strict hierarchy of previous management, but also led to innovation in the factories. At Ex-Yarur, for example, the maintenance division was transformed to produce three quarters of previously imported spare parts. Worker initiative also produced other changes, including new ventilation systems, production processes, and accounting systems (Winn 1986: 212-214) . Moreover, there were signs of an important change from production for exchange value to production for use value, particularly addressing the needs of workers. As described by one metalworker in cordon Vicuña
Mackenna: "the freedom of work is one of the essential successes. Now there is no police repression and we are producing for the people" (Javier Hernández in Mujica 2013: 22-23) . As an example, in one fine furniture producer, workers began to manufacture cheap furniture for their own communities. This was understood as "real" participation in economic activity -the reorientation of production and development priorities to serve the interests of the workers themselves (Mario Olivares in Gaudichaud 2004: 167-168) . As shown in Peter
Winn's in-depth ethnography of the Ex-Yarur plant, wholesale changes were underway in productive activity, social consciousness, and in a transformation towards "a uniquely Chilean economic democracy" (Winn 1986: 226) .
Complementing these "economic" developments were the integration of the cordones into the comandos comunales, community organisations that included mothers' centres and neighbourhood councils (Vergara 2008: 162) . Consequently, the cordones began to move via these engagements from survival responses to crisis to new, and potentially transformative, practices inside and outside the workplace.
Despite (or perhaps even because of) the relative success of the cordones industriales the barriers they faced were substantial. Internal and external challenges included a burgeoning black market, bureaucratic intransigence, and complaints such as those from workers at Ex-Sumar who decried the lack of engagement from the UP and difficulties in mass meetings, including a lack of "discipline" amongst some of their fellow workers in the factory (Silva 1999: 267-268 As the cordones became even more prominent after October 1972, and as a sign of increasing efforts to placate opponents and dismember their nascent organisation, the government ordered the abandonment of occupied factories and cleared protests and barricades with tanks and armed forces administrators sent to the unruliest factories (Silva 1999: 212 & 238-239) . This violent response was a sign of the increasing opposition that was emerging to the cordones as an alternative political economic organisation. Yet repeated efforts by the UP to marginalise and undermine them failed. It was only the military that, using the cordones as examples of "Soviets" plotting an armed takeover of the country, destroyed them in and after the coup of 11 th September 1973.
-Argentina and the empresas recuperadas: reclaiming development
In the wake of the 2001 crisis in Argentina numerous new social movements emerged, with one notable example being the empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores (ERT). There has been a significant amount of recent research on ERTs, focusing on labour process and production (Vieta 2010 (Vieta & 2012 , interaction with the labour movement and the state (Dinerstein 2007) , and evolving political identities (Palomino et al 2010; Sitrin 2010; Vieta 2012 ). The following section synthesises empirical findings of this and other research alongside using detailed analyses produced by Ruggeri (2010 Ruggeri ( , 2014 . As a general trend, the majority of ERTs were founded through struggle (Lavaca Collective 2004) . This was apparent, for example, at the Brukman, but also in many other examples:
We were going on fifteen days during which, although there was a ton of work, they didn't pay us a cent. There was growing unrest that broke out on the fifth floor, in the pants section, where there was a smaller group than ours… Their anger was boiling over faster than ours, and they practically stopped production… Supposedly we took home a hundred pesos every Friday, but that was already history at this point (Ruggeri 2010: 29) .
In terms of wages and employment ERTs have been an undeniable success compared to many workers' former experiences of employment. For example, 56
per cent maintain a policy of equal pay and more than half of those that do not have a maximum pay gap of below 25 per cent (Ozarow & Croucher 2014: 999) .
Between 2004 and 2010, moreover, the number of workers in ERTs has increased from roughly 7000 to around 9400. Of this increase, 1762 are from newly established ERTs, meaning that around 700 were the result of rising employment levels (Ruggeri 2010: 39) . Significantly, many new workers have been brought into the cooperative as full members. For example, in those ERTs established between 2010 and 2013, only 2 per cent of workers are hired on contracted terms and the majority of these are either aspiring to be members or hired solely for fixed terms (Ruggeri 2014: 34) . As with decisions over pay parity, it is the extent of earlier struggles that have determined whether new workers become part of the cooperative or are hired as contracted employees (Kabat 2011: 376) .
The most significant innovations in these factories, highlighting their genuine transformational potential, are in the transformation of the social organisation of work. Decision-making has been democratised, with the majority of ERTs managed by workers' councils through regular assemblies. Eighty-one percent of council and assembly members are appointed directly from the factory floor in those ERTs established after 2010, with fewer than twenty-seven percent having previously acted as union delegates (Ruggeri 2014: 39) . Everyday issues are solved on the shop floor and new work processes approved and adopted amongst flexible work teams (Vieta 2012: 143; Kabat 2011: 377-380) . New forms of accounting address the alienation felt by workers from the production process under private ownership, utilising new methods to transcend previous regulatory and institutional controls (Bryer 2012: 45-46) . Overall, the "humanising" of the labour process and the transformation of the workplace has been notable. Flexible work, slower production processes, and the "incorporation of play and rest in the transformation of the rhythm of the working day"
demonstrate an overcoming of the disciplining effect of work and the workplace (Vieta 2012: 142) . This has been complemented by the elimination of the distinction between manual and intellectual work, increasing delegation, and growing versatility as workers take on new tasks in the workplace (Kabat 2011: 376) . Job rotation is a particularly significant practice, shifting away from prevailing hierarchical and repetitive structures of work. This occurs in over twothirds of newly established ERTs, rising to seventy percent in those established prior to 2010 (Ruggeri 2014: 40) . Workers, as such, are experiencing a new way of working, promoting the construction of an alternative development by being able to enjoy more control over their working lives, a more positive balance between work and leisure time, and learn a wider range of skills than under their former employers.
The interaction of these worker-managed firms with the community is also Zánon and the Workers' Solidarity Union (UST), a construction and parks maintenance firm, transfer revenue into community development projects (Vieta 2012: 147-149) . Combined with the shifting attitudes in the workplace, these activities point towards a transformation in economic and social relations. New experiences of solidarity in the workplace have engendered new cooperative social relations that give new meaning to work and the beginnings of more "social production" orientated towards producing what is understood as social wealth rather than profit-orientated capitalist surplus (Vieta 2012: 138; Vieta 2010: 311-312 ). These intersect, moreover, with the horizontal social relations of the social movements and community organisations that emerged after 2001, contributing to the emergence of a new political subjectivity centred on production and occupation of the workplace (Sitrin 2010: 139-140) .
Nevertheless, there are limits for the ERTs. Workers' control will always struggle to be translated into a non-capitalist form of labour-centred development as long as it exists within a capitalist sphere of circulation. In this instance, the cooperative form of workplace organisation places significant constraints on workers in the ERTs. Marina Kabat (2011: 369-374) highlights how it has placed large financial burdens on newly established firms that, although somewhat overcome through the varied mechanisms described above, still stymie productive activity in many instances. She also points out that it has led, in many cases, to the return of capitalist relations in the factory, which include, most notably, the continued hiring of contracted employees and the sale of stock to external investors.
To counter these constraints, Baldacchino (1990: 473) argues for the creation of "counter-institutional" support. This has, to an extent, begun to occur.
So-called intracooperative and intercooperative learning processes have been at the heart of relations within and between the ERTs and the latter have been formalised in vertical integration agreements that include the sharing of materials to eliminate the pressures of competition (Vieta 2012: 139; Ozarow & Croucher 2014: 997) . Not only has this led to a change in the attitudes and activities of workers, but also to the relations between the occupied firms. Yet despite close local relations with other community and grassroots organisations, the wider "counter-institutional support" remains at an early and fragile stage. Moreover, whilst workers have gained enhanced freedom in work and, to a lesser extent, in exchange, they are still subjected to the laws of the capitalist market as transmitted via the sphere of circulation (Atzeni and Ghigliani: 2007: 668) . The rigours of competition, securing customers and supplies, competing with existing producers in an environment hostile to these worker-led entities, and the constraints that derive from the cooperative form pose a serious threat to their continued existence.
-CONCLUSIONS
In the early years of this millennium the left turn in Latin America raised hopes amongst many progressives of a challenge to seemingly dominant forms of neoliberal economic orthodoxy and the establishment of new paths of human development. Some of these new regimes had gained political office based in large part on sustained mass movements and struggles from below. It was assumed widely -by participants in those struggles and by many commentators -that the regimes would embody the spirits and desires of these movements to alter in fundamental ways, the strategies, practices and outcomes of development in the region. Progressive thinkers, who place(d) so much hope in new forms of development being delivered from above, should consider whether it is better to look to collective actions from below as generative of more democratic, egalitarian, inclusive and cooperative forms of human development.
Many of the neodevelopmentalist regimes are now in crisis. As they turn towards more traditional (and authoritarian) forms of development, they will attempt, with ever greater intensity, to preclude the emergence of collective labouring class movements and their associated ideologies of progressive human change. The clash between elite led development, and attempts at LCD, which have often been occluded by relatively progressive social policy and the incorporation of subaltern movements into elite-led political movements, may become increasingly apparent. Under such circumstances the need for an alternative ideology, strategy, practice and conception of human development becomes ever more important.
